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Housing the
Homeless Through
Expanding Access
to Existing
Housing Subsidies
Barbara Sard
The premise of this article is that homelessness in America today is essentially a product
of the lack of affordable housingfor very low-income people. The article outlines this
central income/housing gap analysis as the factualpredicate of the goal to alleviate
homelessness through securing subsidized housing resources for the homeless and immi-
nently homeless. It explains why, based on the nature and number ofannually available
housing subsidies, expanding access to existing housing subsidies is a valuable, work-
able, short-term, at least partial solution to the immediate crisis oflack ofaffordable
housing, albeit one which does not negate the acknowledged necessity of increasing the
supply ofsuch subsidies. It suggests six strategies legal advocates may pursue to expand
access for the homeless to the existing housing subsidy resources in their community.
Finally, questions are raised about the value of this approach, in contrast to a focus
solely on increasing the overall supply ofincome or housing subsidies, for which space
permits only limited and tentative answers.
Homelessness in America today is essentially a product of the lack of affordable
housing for very low-income people. While "macro" solutions in the form of
increased incomes, an increased number of subsidies for housing, and an increased
supply of lower-cost housing are vital, they require years of political and legislative
effort. If only macro solutions will solve the problem, what are lawyers representing
homeless clients today to do? Is there a legal strategy available to assist these clients
to solve their central problem, the lack of a place to live that they can afford? The
answer is yes, through expanding access to existing housing subsidies. 1
Why is Expanding Access a Worthwhile Approach?
The current crisis of homelessness in our society is primarily the result of the
increasing gap between household income and housing costs. While individual
dysfunctions may help determine which families or individuals are most vulnerable
to the shortfall in the supply of housing that the poor can afford, the predominant
Barbara Sard, a lecturer at Harvard Law School, is managing attorney, Homelessness Unit, Greater Boston
Legal Services.
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cause of the worst homelessness epidemic since the Great Depression is increasing
poverty in the face of a decreasing supply of low-cost housing. 2
What the confluence of these forces means, in practical terms, with regard to the
ability of the private housing market to meet housing needs, is that either there is
too little low-cost housing in a community for those who need it or, particularly in
many of the country's major urban areas, which experienced extreme inflation in
housing costs in the 1980s, there is virtually no private market housing within the
economic reach of the homeless. Nor can the private housing market, without sub-
stantial government subsidies, increase the supply of housing that the homeless or
imminently homeless can afford.
Consequently, the solution to the income/housing gap lies in closing the gap from
either, or both, directions: by increasing their income so the homeless can afford what-
ever housing there is, and/or by increasing the supply of housing subsidies. Even in
areas of the country where the housing stock is such that increased incomes or housing
purchasing power would substantially alleviate the problem, it is extremely difficult to
muster the political will to expand and increase public assistance income maintenance
programs, which could provide such income. This is even more true in communities
where housing costs have escalated. The same can be said for the political barriers that
exist to the creation of the kind of job training plus public employment (and child
care) programs which are necessary if any substantial number of the homeless are to
increase their incomes through employment rather than income transfers.
Thus, whether by choice3 or necessity, the primary solution to the income/housing
gap is to increase the amount of subsidized housing4 available to the homeless and
imminently homeless. One obvious way to accomplish this goal is to legislate an
increase in deep subsidy housing programs and require all or some significant por-
tion of the increased resources to go to the homeless and imminently homeless. In
light of the enormous shortfall between housing needs and housing supply, a strat-
egy directed at "more" is certainly vital. Without it, we will not end the national dis-
grace of homelessness.
However, whether it is possible to generate the political will to increase the supply
of housing is perhaps as doubtful as the possibility of creating the political will to
substantially increase the incomes of the poor. While the struggle to increase the
total supply of housing continues in these tight fiscal times, to assist the currently
homeless, it is imperative to look to whether the existing supply of subsidized hous-
ing is being fully utilized or is going to those legally entitled to, and most in need of,
such subsidies. There are additional strategies available to homeless people and
their advocates to increase the proportion of the existing supply of subsidized hous-
ing which goes to the homeless and imminently homeless. As these strategies can
result in virtually immediate housing solutions for at least some of the homeless,
they can be used by lawyers and others working with individual homeless clients and
client groups to "solve" their clients' problems. I outline six strategies to maximize
access of the homeless and imminently homeless to existing housing subsidies and
briefly review some of the questions they raise. While I draw heavily on my experi-
ence in Massachusetts, the strategies should be replicable elsewhere.
Subsidies Exist
Currently, there are three major kinds of deeply subsidized federal housing pro-
grams. "Walk-around" rental subsidies, usually known as Section 8 certificates or
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vouchers, issued by public housing authorities (PHAs), can be used by the holder to
rent a housing unit of acceptable quality. Public housing consists of housing units
owned and usually managed by a PHA, in which the tenant's rent is limited to 30
percent of income. Privately owned, federally subsidized developments have
"project-based" subsidies available to some or all of the tenants who move into
those developments. Some states also fund deep subsidy housing programs, which
may be similar in program design to the federal programs.
As of 1988, 2.3 million households received Section 8 subsidies, most of which were
walk-around certificates or vouchers. Also as of 1988, there were 1.4 million public
housing units managed by PHAs. Of the privately owned housing constructed or sub-
stantially rehabilitated with federal funds, in addition to those with Section 8 subsi-
dies included above, there are several hundred thousand deeply subsidized units.
Besides the relatively small number of additional new subsidies or subsidized units
for which funds have been appropriated by Congress each year, a not insignificant
number of units and subsidies annually become available as current tenants leave or
become ineligible for continued subsidy. No national data appear to be maintained
on the number and type of such "turnover" subsidies. If the Massachusetts experi-
ence is typical, however, approximately 10 percent of Section 8s turn over and are
available for reissuance each year. The turnover rate for public housing in Mas-
sachusetts appears to be somewhat less: state officials have estimated that approxi-
mately 5 percent of public housing units turn over each year, although the rate is
much higher at the violence-plagued inner-city projects in Boston. Extrapolating
from these rates, it is likely that roughly 330,000 such units are available for reas-
signment each year.
While 330,000 deep subsidies, even were they all targeted annually to the home-
less, are inadequate to meet the need (and we must not forget that the "need"
extends beyond those who are already homeless or at immediate risk of becoming
homeless), it is surely not an insignificant figure. Ironically, it is more than sufficient
to house the number of homeless estimated by the Reagan administration in 1983. 5
Potential Strategies to Maximize Access
My premise is that, currently, a relatively small proportion of the existing deeply
subsidized housing resources which turn over each year are reissued to the home-
less, or even the imminently homeless. 6 The reasons for this are several. First, house-
holds with a fairly broad range of incomes are eligible for federally subsidized hous-
ing programs. Families with incomes up to 50 percent of the area median income are
eligible for all deeply subsidized federal housing assistance programs. Families with
even higher incomes are eligible. While many families nearer the upper end of these
income limits undoubtedly have housing needs, they are unlikely to be homeless
without housing assistance. Second, Congress has defined the categories of appli-
cants who must receive preference for federal housing resources far more broadly
than the currently or imminently homeless or displaced, as applicants living in sub-
standard housing or paying more than 50 percent of their income for housing costs
also receive preference. Finally, many homeless applicants are excluded from partic-
ipation in subsidized housing programs as a result of the policies and practices
described below.
How existing deeply subsidized housing resources are distributed may usefully be
categorized into six problem areas. Successful efforts toward challenge or reform in
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the following areas should result in a substantial increase in the resources allocated
to those whose need is the greatest:
1. The failure of subsidized housing owners and PHAs to utilize available con-
tracted federally funded subsidies
2. The violation of the federal preference rules by many PHAs and subsidized
owners
3. The failure of most public housing authorities and subsidized owners to give
top priority to the homeless
4. The administrative maze through which subsidized housing resources are
delivered, requiring literally hundreds of applications to be filed in order to maxi-
mize the opportunity for a homeless applicant to obtain available resources
5. Procedural barriers erected by the housing authorities and subsidized housing
owners, which have a particularly harsh impact on the homeless
6. Discrimination by many public housing authorities and subsidized housing
owners against disabled and handicapped applicants who are not mobility impaired.
Failure to Utilize Federally Funded Subsidies
When Section 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation projects were funded
by HUD in the 1970s, HUD entered into contracts with the owners to subsidize,
through the Section 8 program, the rent of families in a specified number of units,
so that each such family would have to pay only the percentage of family income for
rent required under the Section 8 program. Rather than utilizing all these subsidies,
owners of an increasing number of projects have been renting what should have
been subsidized units at market rates.
Because of standing barriers erected by some federal courts to challenges to such
underutilization by applicants, it has been difficult through litigation to remedy the
problem and make these funded subsidies available to needy families. In the
Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Congress has effectively
reversed the prior appellate decision, as well as making clear that owners are legally
obligated to use their full contract authority to rent to income-eligible families. Con-
sequently, litigation to enforce the use of all available subsidies should now be possi-
ble. At least 70 percent of the subsidized units that become available under this law
must go to federal preference holders, including the homeless.
While the Cranston-Gonzalez amendments have, on the whole, made it far more
straightforward to achieve full utilization of deep subsidies in privately owned devel-
opments, the mere enactment of this law is not likely to alter the predilection of
owners to rent to more affluent tenants. Thus, enforcement may well be necessary to
realize the increased availability of subsidies that the law requires. Rather than the
highly laborious work required to determine whether there are unutilized subsidies
in any particular development, 7 it may be possible to induce, or require, a state
agency, if not HUD, to undertake such enforcement work.
Public housing authorities administering Section 8 existing and Section 8 voucher
programs may also have contracted and funded Section 8 subsidies available, which
they are unlawfully failing to distribute. For the last several years, the Worcester,
Massachusetts, Housing Authority failed to allocate over 340 Section 8 certificates
and vouchers, approximately 30 percent of its total portfolio. In mid-1990, the
Chelsea, Massachusetts, Housing Authority decided to stop issuing its available Sec-
tion 8 subsidies. Neither of these housing authorities turned these funded resources
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back to HUD for reallocation to PHAs willing to use them, so available federal
funds for deep subsidies simply went unutilized. When legal services attorneys
placed the HUD regional office formally on notice of the blatant failure of these
PHAs to comply with federal policy, and, at least in Chelsea, the probable racially
discriminatory motivation for such failure, HUD did intervene, without litigation,
and require the PHAs to issue and lease, up to available subsidies, to applicants
selected in accordance with federal law.
Violation ofthe Federal Preference Rules
Traditionally, subsidized housing resources were distributed on a first come, first
served basis through a chronological waiting list maintained by each housing author-
ity. In recognition of the enormous shortage of housing resources in relation to
need, particularly after the drastic cutbacks in federal funding for low-income hous-
ing that began in the early eighties, Congress directed that certain categories of
applicant families be given preference over earlier ("standard") applicants not quali-
fying for preference in the various federal housing programs. In January 1988, HUD
finally promulgated regulations to implement these federal preferences.
Under current law, federal preference is given to three categories of applicants:
those occupying substandard housing (including the homeless), involuntarily dis-
placed, or paying more than 50 percent of their income for rent. The substantial
majority of federally subsidized housing resources must be distributed to applicants
qualifying for one of these preferences. While PHAs and owners may use "local"
preferences to rank all federal preference holders, all applicants qualifying under at
least one of the federal preference categories must come before applicants who do
not qualify for federal preference, with minor exceptions.
Because of the preferred status that proper implementation of the federal prefer-
ence regulations gives to homeless applicants (at least those who meet the federal
definition), it is potentially critical to homeless applicants' achieving relatively quick
receipt of a housing subsidy that PHAs and subsidized owners grant federal prefer-
ence to homeless applicants who are entitled to it and that they abide by the require-
ment that federal preference holders come before standard applicants.
The only data HUD appears to keep on PHA implementation of the federal pref-
erence regulations are in the individual management audits of particular housing
authorities. It appears that HUD audits emphasize units or certificates wrongly
issued, rather than checking cases of applicants who may have been wrongly denied.
Based on two years of experience of the Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS)
Homelessness Unit representing applicants for federal preference at a variety of
PHAs and private federally subsidized owners in eastern Massachusetts, however, I
believe that there may be widespread violation of the federal regulations. For exam-
ple, in a medium-size housing authority right next to Boston, GBLS discovered that
41 percent of the Section 8 certificates awarded in the first eighteen months after
the federal preference regulations went into effect went to non-federal preference
holders, at a time when the PHA admitted that it had federal preference holders on
its waiting list.
Such a violation of the fundamental rule of federal preference holders first can
occur for a variety of reasons, beyond the straightforward legal violation that
appears to have occurred at this PHA. At many PHAs in Massachusetts, we have
found that the PHAs' federal preference "system" does not on its face comply with
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federal law, usually either because it omits any mention of groups mandated by the
federal regulations as federal preference holders and/or because it explicitly places
some groups, deemed to have "local" preference but who do not fit into any of the
federal preference categories, in a ranking above federal preference holders. We
have also found PHAs which, in their application of their preference plans, deny
federal preference status to applicants who come within the federal definitions.
Such practices not only result in applicants who are legally entitled to federal
preference status being denied such status, and therefore probably subsidized hous-
ing as well, but also make it possible, depending on the number of federal preference
holders on the waiting list in relation to the number of available resources, for appli-
cants without federal preference to obtain more of the available subsidies. In addition,
if a PHA closes its waiting list for Section 8 applicants when its waiting list contains
any standard applicants or when it has a ranked preference system and its list con-
tains applicants with less than first preference, it is likely that the PHA is unlawfully
denying the right of an applicant claiming federal preference status to be placed on
the waiting list. As a consequence of such unlawful closing, applicants entitled to
federal preference status are substantially delayed in their receipt of housing assis-
tance, or totally denied such right.
By aggressive representation of applicants for subsidized housing resources, it
should be possible to remedy these violations and enforce homeless applicants'
rights as federal preference holders. However, it would certainly be more efficient if
HUD could be made to take its role as grantor of federal funds more seriously, in
light of the fact that actions may otherwise have to be brought against a very large
number of PHAs (although class or group defendant actions could be possible).
More aggressive congressional oversight could induce such action on HUD's part. It
could also be a worthwhile strategy to sue HUD for its failure to properly implement
the federal housing laws, including the fair housing laws, as violation of the federal
preference rules is likely to have a racially discriminatory effect.
Failure to Give Top Priority to the Homeless
Public housing agencies and private subsidized owners administering federally sub-
sidized housing programs subject to the federal preference regulations have the
authority, under the HUD regulations, to rank the federal preference categories,
or even subgroups within the categories. Where subsidized housing resources are
insufficient to serve all applicants entitled to federal preference within a reasonable
period of time, homeless applicants would benefit substantially if homelessness were
to be ranked as the top preference category. 8 In addition, public housing authorities
could require that the homeless receive all or a substantial portion of the 30 percent
of units with project-based assistance for which they have discretion to set local,
nonfederal preference for admission.
HUD does not keep any centralized records, nor has it issued any reports, of
what preference systems have been adopted by PHAs, so it is impossible to say with
any precision what percentage of PHAs or owners administering federal housing
resources accord top preference to the homeless within a ranked preference system.
If the Massachusetts experience is typical, however, most PHAs, at least the smaller
ones, and most private owners of federally subsidized units do not rank the federal
preferences at all. Of those which do have a ranked system, the homeless are ranked
first in few cases.
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There are basically two approaches to accomplishing top ranking of homeless
applicants for federal housing resources in particular areas: persuasion or mandate.
Persuasion may be grounded on public policy-relative need arguments alone, 9 or
enhanced by a fiscal "incentive," such as occurs when the costs of emergency shelter
will be reduced by targeting housing resources at the families who would otherwise
be sheltered at enormous state expense. A mandate can be achieved through admin-
istrative rule making by a supervisory state housing agency, legislation, 10 or court
order. Politics will probably dictate whether administrative or legislative advocacy is
likely to be fruitful in a particular state. While no court has, to my knowledge, yet
issued such an order, it is within a court's equitable power to do so where executive
branch liability for homelessness of a particular group has been found, and where
there may be no, or insufficient, appropriated funds available to fashion a remedy.
Balkanized Administration ofPrograms
When a person in the United States wishes to apply for Social Security benefits, he
or she goes to the Social Security Administration office that serves the local area.
The benefits the person is eligible to receive are the same regardless of where in the
U.S.A. the person lives, and the time it takes to receive benefits after application is
unlikely to vary according to where the person applies. The same situation occurs
for persons wishing to apply for unemployment compensation or public assistance
benefits, although the benefits vary in each state.
In contrast to virtually all other major government benefit programs for individu-
als, however, anyone wishing to apply for subsidized housing has to make literally
hundreds of applications in any particular state in order to maximize the chances of
receiving benefits. This can be true even in a state where the only subsidized housing
programs are federally funded.
Such balkanized distribution of a basic resource is a product of the localized
system of funding conduits established by Congress for federal housing dollars. In
the first thirty years of federal housing programs, funding essentially went into
public housing programs, through contracts with public housing authorities estab-
lished pursuant to state law. Generally, the jurisdiction of a PHA follows city or
town lines, although regional or even statewide PHAs are possible. While we have
only fifty states, approximately 2,000 PHAs administer a federal Section 8 program.
In some states, an applicant must file separate applications at literally hundreds of
PHAs to maximize his or her chance of receiving a walk-around Section 8 subsidy,
even though such subsidies can now be used anywhere in the state (and in some
contiguous areas of neighboring states).
Complicating matters further, PHAs frequently require a separate application to
be filed for their public housing and Section 8 project-based programs, in addition
to the application for walk-around Section 8 certificates and vouchers. Then, in
addition to the tens or hundreds of PHAs at which one might wish to submit one or
several applications, to receive a project-based subsidized unit at one of the poten-
tially hundreds of privately owned and federally or state subsidized developments
in an area, a separate application must be made to each project.
Not only are there hundreds of PHAs or private developments to which one
should apply to maximize one's chances of receiving a housing subsidy, but each
PHA or private developer is free, under federal law, to adopt its own system for
ranking the federal preferences. State-funded resources may be distributed under
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rules different from the federal preferences. While at least the PHA plans and rules
are technically publicly available, 11 there is no one place to get them. No government
agency gathers them all, nor is any government agency required to collect turnover
and waiting list information.
Consequently, it is impossible for a homeless applicant desperate for housing
to act like the proverbial rational person, choosing to apply at those agencies/
developments where they are likely to have the best chance of getting housing in
light of the fit between their circumstances and the applicable tenant selection rules
and the relative availability of new or turnover resources in the bedroom size they
need.
While major urban centers may have years-long waiting lists even for federal
preference holders, the experience in Massachusetts has been that PHAs in small
communities frequently have relatively few federal preference holders on their wait-
ing lists. A homeless applicant who is legally entitled to preference may then be able
to receive a housing subsidy fairly quickly from an outlying community in the subur-
ban ring or even in a distant rural area. Even if the family does not wish to move to
the grantee community, a Section 8 walk-around subsidy can be used to rent housing
in the urban area of origin, or any other community in the state to which the person
wishes to move.
While federal law permits this balkanized "system" of distributing federal housing
resources, it does not require it, at least in its current extreme form. Just as states
could require all PHAs and private owners with federally subsidized resources to
comply with a state-ordered system for ranking federal preference holders, states
could also require PHAs and owners to submit information about likely availability
of units to a central or regional clearinghouse, and litigation could provoke them to
mandate such reporting. States could also reduce the barriers created by balkanized
administration by requiring PHAs and private subsidized owners to accept applica-
tions by mail, and to use the same application form, which could be photocopied and
sent to the long list of distributors of subsidized housing resources.
While such state-level strategies only tinker with the federally created balkanized
system, which can best be altered by changing federal law, implementation of clear-
inghouses and streamlined application processes should help increase the conscious-
ness of the sharp inconsistency between the nature of current housing subsidy pro-
grams, in which approximately half the resources are portable income subsidies, and
the outdated localized manner in which housing resources are now distributed, and
of the need for change.
Procedural Barriers
Achieving access to existing subsidized housing resources requires surmounting a
number of procedural barriers, which create particular difficulty for the homeless.
For example, PHAs frequently refuse to take any applications for their Section 8
programs, even from federal preference holders, on the grounds that their lists are
"closed." People who do manage to get their names on the waiting list are frequently
"purged," for failure to respond to a letter sent to an address they are no longer at,
even though the PHA had no resource to offer the person at the time the letter was
sent, but was simply "updating" its list. For those who do make it through to the eli-
gibility determination process, a seemingly endless stream of verification require-
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merits, often for pieces of paper a homeless person cannot possibly obtain, 12 creates
a literal "paper chase" that inevitably winnows down the number of applicants able
to complete the course. Finally, because the notices and appeal procedures used by
many PHAs and private subsidized owners lack the basic rudiments of due process,
applicants are frequently unable to effectively utilize the appeal process to vindicate
their right to receive subsidized housing resources.
None of these procedural barriers is required by federal law, although some, such
as the purging of the lists, appear to be encouraged by HUD. Some may be moti-
vated in part by concerns of administrative efficiency. None was designed explicitly
to exclude the homeless. 13 However, in each of these respects, PHAs are unfortu-
nately following in the steps of other bureaucracies seeking to limit the number of
applicants found eligible, without publicly admitting that they are narrowing the eli-
gibility rules, with the effect of making the perceived need for subsidized housing
substantially less than the reality.
PHAs may also, by creating such procedural hurdles, be purposely trying to
exclude those least able to negotiate the obstacle course: the least literate, the least
articulate, the least mobile (to get around to the required verification sources), and
those without stable addresses. These are likely to be the poorest of the applicants,
disproportionately language and/or racial minorities, and the handicapped. Such
exclusionary tactics may be motivated simply by localism— a desire not to distribute
scarce housing resources to people not seen as "theirs"— and/or by racial or class
prejudice. Whatever the motivation, advocates for the housing needy in general,
as well as the homeless, should expose such policies as having no proper place in
government-funded housing programs and work to eliminate them.
All these procedural barriers are subject to legal challenge or could be altered
by state-level rule making or legislation, as briefly suggested above, as well as, of
course, by changes in federal regulations or statute. Such changes would benefit
not only homeless applicants, but all applicants for public and subsidized housing
resources. Why have few such challenges been brought? Probably because subsi-
dized housing admissions issues have not been a primary focus of legal effort since
initial, basic reforms were accomplished in the late sixties and early seventies, after
federally funded legal services were first available, such as waiting lists, proscribing
arbitrary exclusions of classes of potentially eligible applicants, and rudimentary
notice and hearing requirements.
From the perspective of clients who are desperate for housing, however, over-
coming these procedural barriers, particularly after the implementation of the fed-
eral preferences, is often the means to solving the clients' most critical problem.
Such advocacy can not only help numerous individual clients as well as applicants
overall, but can also eliminate structural barriers to homeless applicants' being able
to benefit equally from publicly funded housing programs.
Discrimination
A significant proportion of the homeless, particularly of people without minor
children, meet the federal definitions of "disabled" or handicapped." As a result,
they meet not only the basic categorical eligibility requirement federal law has
imposed on single applicants for housing, 14 but are eligible for special elderly/
handicapped housing resources, in addition to family housing.
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Some local housing authorities and private subsidized owners have unlawfully
restricted elderly/handicapped housing to the elderly and the mobility-impaired
handicapped, who need the alleged special amenities of such housing, prohibiting
access to other handicapped and disabled persons. In some areas these unlawful
practices have resulted in subsidized housing units remaining vacant because the
aged applicants— those actually sixty-two and over— may not wish to go into the
available units because of the neighborhood in which they are located. In addition,
because relatively few such actually elderly applicants are entitled to federal prefer-
ence, compared, for example, with the actually homeless or precariously housed dis-
abled or handicapped, even if there were not units standing vacant, eliminating such
discrimination should result in relatively rapid offers of turnover housing resources
to applicants with federal preference status. 15
In addition to removing such blanket exclusions of the non-mobility impaired
disabled and handicapped from housing for which federal law makes them eligible,
it will also be necessary, to open up such housing resources and all other family
housing resources to many of the now homeless, to eliminate tenant suitability stan-
dards, which have a discriminatory impact on the handicapped, particularly the men-
tally handicapped. A landmark case on this issue was recently won. 16 Although the
judgment technically applies only to the local PHA, HUD has written instructions
to all PHAs to follow the court's ruling in that case, as HUD has agreed that the
court's decision is required by the Fair Housing Act Amendments, which HUD is
bound to uphold.
Even with such instructions, however, if past experience is a guide, the instruc-
tions will not automatically be complied with. As HUD is notorious for failing to
supervise PHAs, and particularly private owners, actual enforcement will require
state- and local-level vigilance. In addition, other common PHA or private subsi-
dized owner systematic exclusions of applicants on suitability grounds, such as
denials for prior records of "bad" tenancies, despite proof of subsequent rehabili-
tation from the substance abuse that caused the prior bad acts of failure to pay rent,
damage to the apartment, and so on, may be challengeable on handicap
discrimination grounds. This is a fertile area for creative legal work.
Long-term Questions about Subsidy Eligibility
In any single year, and perhaps over an even longer time frame, advocacy targeted at
who gets available subsidized housing resources is admittedly a strategy that does not
get beyond a zero-sum game, except in the instances when available subsidies are not
being used. Therefore, focusing on access and eligibility issues on behalf of the home-
less, particularly preference rules, 17 is potentially divisive of the broader constituency
for increasing the supply of housing benefits and affordable housing programs.
Perhaps it is a sufficient justification that obtaining housing subsidies for other-
wise homeless clients is a critical service to our arguably most needy clients. But
when housing lawyer colleagues challenge this work as "merely rearranging the deck
chairs on the Titanic," it would be preferable to have a better response than that all
the applicants are not equally likely to drown. 18
While there is not yet evidence to prove the proposition in the housing context,
recent experience in other social welfare programs suggests that a potentially
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expansive dynamic can result from making visible the "holes in the safety net." For
example, concerted publicity about the cutoff of SSI and Social Security Disability
benefits by the Reagan administration's severe review policy finally prompted not
only judicial, but also congressional sanction to ensure that the disabled continued
to receive benefits. In the mid-1980s, Congress also redressed a few of the eligibility
restrictions it had imposed on the AFDC and food stamp programs, after hearing
evidence that the harm inflicted was more severe than intended.
Similarly, one hoped-for result of struggling to expand subsidized housing priority
for the homeless, in the rules both as written and as applied, is that increasing the
number of applicants acknowledged to be entitled to preference will make the need
even more visible, with a consequent increase in resources to respond to the need.
True, homelessness is already the most visible part of the housing crisis. But many
policymakers, as well as members of the public, nonetheless believe that the home-
less are without housing because they are somehow not "housing ready" or don't
want housing. Such detractions from the fundamental claim to housing should be
undercut by cold proof of the numbers of applicants found eligible and entitled to
priority status for subsidized housing whose needs cannot be met.
In addition, to the extent that housing authorities, legislators, and/or better-off
applicants on the waiting lists object to the homeless being served "instead of"
others, the challenge is to enlist the energy of these potentially more politically
influential groups in the struggle to expand the supply of resources. Such hoped-for
alliances may require that new resources be targeted to broader eligibility groups
than the already homeless. But if the pot can truly be expanded more than homeless
advocates could accomplish on their own, such an alliance is of general benefit.
The second major question raised by pursuing strategies to increase access to
public and subsidized housing is whether increased centralization and standardiza-
tion of programs and rules is really going to help low-income applicants in general,
and homeless applicants in particular, over the long run. Advocacy pressure toward
both centralization of formerly locally administered programs, and increased speci-
fication of eligibility rules and procedures, has been a key element of the welfare
rights strategy for the last twenty-five years. While some proponents of progressive
welfare programs have criticized these strategies for rigidifying welfare decision
making, 19 and it is certainly true that rules can be as exclusionary as unfettered
discretion, on balance it appears that the politically disfavored are generally best
off when programs for their benefit are administered at a level more distant from
local prejudice, and when decisions must be made in accordance with rules subject
to review. 20
Even if one accepts these general lessons drawn from the social welfare context,
however, there is still a question whether the nature of housing programs requires
or suggests an answer different from one in the welfare context. Arguably, the local
nature of housing construction programs, with the inevitable issues of zoning, neigh-
borhood mix, and the like, require as much locally based support as can be mus-
tered. Even if that is true for construction programs, however, walk-around subsidies
such as the federal Section 8 program are essentially income maintenance programs
in a housing guise: they are income supplements earmarked for housing needs. Pro-
gram beneficiaries are dispersed in the community, in whatever private units they
can locate. No local support for building additional housing is necessary. Conse-
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quently, whatever arguments for local administration of housing construction pro-
grams there may be do not appear to apply to programs that operate strictly as
rent subsidies. 21
While this discussion of the long-term implications of the strategies to increase
access to existing subsidies and public/subsidized housing is necessarily preliminary,
it suggests that a more thorough analysis of similar strategies used in other social
welfare programs would be very helpful in the evolution of strategies to reform the
administration of housing programs to meet the needs of our most low-income citi-
zens. While such inquiry continues, however, and while efforts to increase housing
resources go on, advocates should not overlook the substantial promise strategies
such as those discussed in this article hold for creating real housing opportunities
for homeless clients, fa
Notes
1. The ideas^presented here were generated and refined from the work of the Homelessness
Unit of Greater Boston Legal Services in our representation of individual clients as well as the
Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless. Due to space constraints, most of the explanatory
and supporting footnotes have been omitted from this article. A fully footnoted version, which
is particularly useful for legal advocates, appears in the spring 1992 issue of the Villanova
Law Review.
2. Useful readings on the economic causes of homelessness include R Rossi, Down and Out
in America: The Origins of Homelessness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989);
K. Hopper and J. Hamburg,"The Making of America's Homeless: From Skid Row to New Poor,
1945-1984," in R. Bratt, C. Hartman, and A. Myerson, eds., Critical Perspectives on Housing
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986); R Leonard, C. Dolbeare, and E. Lazere, A Place
to Call Home: The Crisis in Housing the Poor (Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities and Low Income Housing Information Service, 1989); C. Dolbeare, Out of Reach:
Why Everyday People Can't Find Affordable Housing (Washington, D.C.: Low Income Housing
Information Service, 1990); National Coalition for the Homeless, The Closing Door: Economic
Causes of Homelessness (Washington, D.C., 1990).
3. Many housing advocates believe that it is preferable, as a policy matter, to close the income/
housing gap from the housing side, through programs that not only subsidize but also control
and reduce housing costs.
4. A "deep" subsidy is one that pays the difference between a percentage of tenant income —
now 30 percent in the federal programs — and the full cost attributable to the housing unit.
In contrast, a "shallow" subsidy is one that reduces housing costs, usually by reduction in the
mortgage interest rate, or by syndication of tax credits, and/or by reduction in the cost of the
land or buildings. Such shallow subsidies result in reduced rental prices in comparison with
wholly private market housing, but they cannot, in light of the costs of building or purchasing
and operating housing, bring costs within 30 percent, or even 50 percent, of a very poor
family's income.
5. A 1984 HUD study numbered the homeless at 250,000-300,000. Most advocates for the
homeless consider this an undercount. See Rossi, Down and Out in America, 37-38, and
chap. 3. While any estimate of the number of homeless is necessarily inaccurate, given the
difficulties of counting the homeless population, it is especially critical to remember that any
such count is as of a single point in time, rather than the number of people who experience
homelessness and therefore need housing over the course of a year. There are very few data
on the duration of homelessness among various subpopulations of the homeless, although
such data are critical for policy and planning purposes.
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6. Unfortunately, there appears to be no data available on this question. There isn't even any fed-
eral data on the number of preference holders on PHA waiting lists. Conversation of Lisa M.
Otero, my research assistant, with Jerry Benoit, HUD director of Rental Assistance, October
29, 1990. Based on available data in Massachusetts, I have estimated that only approximately
20 percent of the turnover deeply subsidized housing resources are issued to the homeless
each year, including all state and federally funded housing resources, whether controlled by
PHAs or by private owners.
7. Data on subsidy utilization should be available from HUD by means of a written request
pursuant to the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The most likely documents to
contain the critical information for a subsidy utilization challenge are the Housing Assistance
Payments (HAP) contract for each development and the owner's billing requests to HUD for
the six or more months prior to the request.
8. It is probable that similar benefit would result even if homeless applicants were ranked after
those involuntarily displaced, as the number of applicants displaced by natural forces, urban
renewal activities, owners taking property off the rental market, or abuse are relatively small.
In most jurisdictions, the largest group of preference applicants is likely to be those paying
more than 50 percent of income for rent.
9. A PHA may also decide, based on its policy view and/or what it perceives as the particular
needs in its area, to request that HUD approve an altered definition of "homeless." The Boston
Housing Authority, for example, includes within its definition of homeless applicants who
receive second preference and applicants who are doubled up in the home of another. HUD
has recently approved this definition.
10. In a letter dated January 12, 1990, from Frank Keating, general counsel of HUD, to Alex
Bledsoe, then deputy secretary of EOCD, Keating stated, "We find nothing in the United States
Housing Act of 1937 or other Federal law which would constitute a legal impediment to PHAs
following State-directed preferences for the homeless." The letter also says that whether
a state housing agency, rather than a state legislature, could impose such state-required
preference for the homeless on PHAs was a question of state, not federal law.
11. At least for PHAs, all tenant selection plans must be filed with the regional HUD field office,
and therefore could be obtained through a Federal Freedom of Information Act request. The
tenant selection policies and procedures used by PHAs in their public housing programs must
be posted in each PHA office and made available to an applicant or tenant on request. 24 CFR
§960. 204(d)(2). Generally PHAs use the same federal preferences for their public housing and
their Section 8 programs, although they do follow different tenant selection procedures in
each program. Section 8 tenant selection preferences, policies, and procedures must be
contained in a PHAs Administrative Plan for Section 8. 24 CFR §882.204(b)(3)(ii)(B). The HUD
regional office may have the tenant selection plans used by private owners administering
Section 8 project-based subsidies, and must make publicly available the plans it has under
5 U.S.C. §552.
1 2. One of the earliest clients of the GBLS Homelessness Unit presented a perfect example of the
type of Catch-22 that PHA verification requirements often create. Our client had been home-
less for two years as a result of the abandonment of his single-room-occupancy building by
the owner, and its subsequent condemnation. The PHA in his hometown, a working-class
suburb outside Boston, required him to provide verification from that landlord of his suitability
as a tenant before it would approve him for public housing. Of course he couldn't provide
such verification because the landlord was long gone: that was the reason he was homeless.
After our office intervened and threatened to sue if the PHA didn't at least issue a decision on
our client's eligibility based on his having provided all the requested verification he could
obtain, the PHA accepted our client as a tenant, and he was housed within ten days!
13. After homeless advocates pointed out to officials of the Boston Housing Authority the particu-
larly adverse effect on homeless applicants of the BHA's requirements that applicants list all
their "residences" in the prior five years and provide verification other than from relatives from
each location, the BHA official in charge readily conceded that BHA had never looked at its
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admission practices from the perspective of the homeless, despite the fact that a very large
proportion of current BHA applicants are homeless. The BHA agreed to alter many of these
adverse practices.
14. This eligibility restriction remains in effect until HUD issues regulations to implement the
November 1990 change in the federal statute.
15. Many housing advocates, as well as PHA managers, are concerned on a practical level that
it is bad housing policy to "mix" substantial numbers of handicapped, particularly mentally
handicapped, tenants with elderly residents of public or subsidized housing, and that such
mixing will result in diminished quality of life for both the aged residents and the disabled, as
well as leading to disproportionate "housing failure" for the handicapped. Any such concerns,
however, should affect only the remedy sought, including "reasonable accommodations" to
assist the mentally handicapped to maintain their tenancies, and not whether advocates seek
to enforce the rights of the handicapped to public and subsidized housing.
16. Cason v. Rochester Housing Authority, 748 F.Supp. 1002 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
17. Advocacy aimed at procedural fairness, such as adequate notices, reasonable verification
requirements, and fair hearings, presumably inures to the benefit of all applicants, although
such efforts may not be positively received by all nonprofit housing developers in their role as
landlords.
18. One could also counter as to why this challenge should apply to the validity of representing
applicants for a limited resource, but not to the defense of tenants facing eviction from the
same limited resource. Many legal service programs devote substantial resources to such
eviction defense (as I think they should).
19. For example, W. Simon, "Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System," Yale Law
Journal 92 (1983): 1198.
20. See generally, B. Sard, "The Role of the Courts in Welfare Reform," Clearinghouse Review 22
(August/September 1988): 367.
21. Whether increasing the supply of rent subsidies to be used to pay uncontrolled rents to
private landlords (as opposed to the construction, substantial rehabilitation, Or purchase of
publicly or nonprofit owned housing) is a good or the best use of public housing dollars is a
serious issue of housing policy, which is beyond the scope of this article. However, the poten-
tially greater accessibility of income maintenance types of housing subsidies to the politically
and socially disfavored, for example, the homeless and traditional victims of prejudice, like
racial and ethnic minorities, is a vital element of such an analysis.
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